Seis décadas de estudios sobre el autoengaño: problemas perennes y nuevos interrogantes
Palabras clave:
Autoengaño, Filosofía, Ciencia, Explicación, CreenciaResumen
En las últimas seis décadas el fenómeno del autoengaño ha sido objeto de creciente interés no sólo en el ámbito de la filosofía, dentro de la cual fue tradicionalmente estudiado, sino también en el de distintas ciencias, entre ellas la psicología, las neurociencias, la biología evolucionista y las ciencias sociales. Este incremento en el interés ha redundado en una proliferación de interrogantes y propuestas teóricas de muy diversas clases, sin que hasta la fecha se haya logrado una teoría unificada que goce de consenso respecto del fenómeno. En el presente artículo se presentan las preguntas que contemporáneamente se consideran más relevantes sobre el autoengaño, tanto dentro del dominio de la filosofía como en el de diversas ciencias. Asimismo, se analizan algunos problemas conceptuales y epistemológicos derivados de la proliferación de estudios sobre el fenómeno, y se examinan algunas de las líneas de investigación más recientes y promisorias desarrolladas con el fin de resolver algunas dificultades conceptuales bien conocidas.
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